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A review of basic research tools without the confusing
philosophy
A. D. Madden
Information School, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
ABSTRACT
One consequence of novice researchers studying methodology
textbooks is confusion: philosophical terminology is complicated
and sometimes poorly defined. Another consequence is that
inexperienced researchers divide themselves into epistemological
cliques, which can inhibit inter-disciplinary discussions. This is a
particular problem in subjects, such as Information Science, that
bridge disciplines. This article attempts to address these issues by
seeking ground common to researchers, regardless of their
philosophical standpoint. It identifies several ‘tools of the mind’
which are expanded on and discussed. By becoming familiar with
these tools, inexperienced researchers can gain practical insights
that create context for philosophical terms they later encounter.
‘Tools of the mind’ discussed are captured in the following
questions:
(1) What should I research?
(2) How do I go about researching it?
(3) What assumptions have earlier researchers made?
(4) What assumptions can I make without being challenged?
(5) How can I indicate what it is that I am studying to researchers
who wish to build on my work?
(6) What can usefully be compared to the phenomenon I am
researching?
(7) When circumstances change, what new research opportunities
arise?
(8) How do I tell my research story so that it will be reliably
transmitted?
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The teaching of research methods and methodologies is commonplace in English-speak-
ing universities. However, this is a relatively recent development, having become the
norm only within the last thirty years. Until the 1990s, the quality of research training
relied on students’ relationships with their supervisors (Knight & Zuber-Skerritt, 1986;
Malfroy, 2005; Zuber-Skerritt, 1987). There was a clear risk, therefore, that students
only received instruction in methodologies with which their supervisors were familiar.
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Other methodologies, and the philosophical assumptions associated with them, were
often neglected.
The philosopher Mary Midgley was in the habit of comparing philosophy to plumb-
ing. Both activities
have, beneath their surface, a fairly complex system which is usually unnoticed, but which
sometimes goes wrong. In both cases, this can have serious consequences. (Midgley, 1992)
One area where the consequences of ignoring philosophy could be serious is in the teach-
ing of research methods to PhD students.
Much has changed since the 1980s though, and currently there is little danger of phil-
osophy being ignored. Arguably, the opposite is true: in discussions of research, particu-
larly in the social sciences, practical concerns often come second to philosophical issues.
Midgley’s comparison of philosophy and plumbing emphasises the complexity of both.
Complexity often leads to confusion (Crossan, 2003; Crotty, 1998; Dillon & Wals,
2006; Pallas, 2001), which can be discouraging, especially to inexperienced researchers.
Discussion of basic issues about the nature of research is undoubtedly important; but
so too is discussion of basic issues about methods and how they are used (Morgan, 2007).
In this article, I do not seek to downplay the difficulty of philosophy, or to imply that it
should not be taught. Indeed, I would strongly argue against both. However, while phil-
osophy is unavoidably complex, there is much about research methods that is not. Once
understood, such basics provide a context in which relevant philosophical ideas become
less abstract and potentially less confusing.
All professions, whether plumbing, philosophy or research, rely on tools of the trade;
but use of a tool is rarely limited to one branch of a profession. Researchers, whether
qualitative or quantitative, positivist or interpretivist, use many of the same tools. This
article aims to provide a resource for teachers and students of research methods, by iden-
tifying elements of the collection, analysis, interpretation and presentation of findings
that may be of use to researchers, regardless of their philosophical standpoint.
In addition to discussing relevant literature, I also draw on evidence from my own
career. Two experiences, in particular, are key. The first is of a career move that resulted
in a change from being a quantitative researcher developing mathematical models of
agricultural systems (e.g., Madden, 1995), to becoming a qualitative and mixed
methods researcher, exploring aspects of human information behaviour (e.g., Madden
et al., 2018). The second experience is that of organising and participating in researcher
discussions in the Information Schools of two universities (University of Sheffield in the
UK, and Sun Yat-sen University in China).
The nature of Information Studies (IS) makes it particularly relevant to the theme of
this article. It is a diverse discipline with roots in librarianship, communication studies
and computer science. Research in an Information Sciences department ranges from
the development and evaluation of computer programs designed to retrieve and
analyse text and images from databases (e.g., Li et al., 2018), through to aspects of
library governance (e.g., Zhang et al., 2019); so researchers within a single department
may subscribe to very different research philosophies. As a result, the discussion
groups in which I participated involved conversations between researchers who labelled
themselves post-positivists, interpretivists, constructivists and critical theorists.
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Mertkana and Bayrakli (2017) note that the worldviews which inform qualitative
research shape, to a large extent, researcher identity. The same is presumably true of quan-
titative researchers, and it seems that these worldviews are formed early in a researcher’s
career. Most of those taking part in the conversations were PhD students, so were still
working their way through textbooks on methods and methodologies. Since the text-
books began with descriptions of the philosophical underpinnings of research paradigms
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005), these descriptions were echoed in exchanges between the
novice researchers.
However, when the researchers stopped arguing about philosophical differences and
focused on the processes of research, they found that they had more in common than
they had supposed.
Tools of the mind
The lecture I have given most frequently is an ‘Introduction to Information Seeking’. I
begin by asking students what, in their opinion, is the most useful information seeking
tool. Most answers refer to digital technology: some are as general as ‘the Internet’;
others are more specific and are dependent on location. In the UK, ‘Google’ is a favourite
answer, and in China, the search engine ‘Baidu’ is common. Occasionally, someone
(usually a mature student) will insist that information seeking is highly contextual, so
it is not possible to single out a particular tool.
My response is that, in my opinion, the most useful information seeking tool is a good
question. After reflection, students seem to find this a helpful observation, but some chal-
lenge the use of the word tool. Yet the idea of ‘tools of the mind’ (Gregory, 1981, p. 48)
has been well-established since early in the twentieth century (Madden et al., 2018, p.
709). Dewey (1998, p. 58) nominated language as ‘the tool of tools’, and both he and
Vygotsky have contributed greatly to the development of cognitive tools in education
(e.g., Jonnassen, Mayes, McAleese, 1993), while paradigms have provided ‘intellectual
tools’ such as ‘concepts, laws and theories’ (Kuhn, 1970, p. 46).
The suggestion that a question can be a tool of the mind becomes reasonable if it is
accepted that a tool does not need to be tangible, but can be ‘a thing used as means to
consequences’ (Dewey, 1998, p. 58), and can ‘serve as the conductor of man’s
influence on the object of his activity’ (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 55). Understood in this way,
‘thinking tools’ (Jonnassen et al., 1993) can include mnemonics, systems, organising
strategies and focusing techniques, many of which are directly relevant to research.
A researcher’s tool-kit
Research is an information seeking activity, so good questions are key to good research.
In keeping with the idea that a question is a useful tool of the mind, the research tools
discussed in this article are summarised in the following list of questions. The ideas
behind these questions are discussed below, in subsections labelled with the same
number. The ideas are then revisited in a different form (but with the same numbers)
in Figure 1.
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(1) What should I research?
(2) How do I go about researching it?
(3) What assumptions have earlier researchers made?
(4) What assumptions can I make without being challenged?
(5) How can I indicate what it is that I am studying, to researchers who wish to build on
my work?
(6) What can usefully be compared to the phenomenon I am researching?
(7) When circumstances change, what new research opportunities arise?
(8) How do I tell my research story so that it will be reliably transmitted?
Needless to say, this list is far from exhaustive: other researchers with different experi-
ences could usefully add to it.
(1) Focusing ignorance
The role of questions in inspiring discovery is emphasised by Yuval Noah Harari in his
book, ‘Sapiens’, where he argues that
The great discovery that launched the Scientific Revolution was the discovery that humans
do not know the answers to their most important questions
(Harari, 2014, p. 251),
making the Scientific Revolution not a revolution in knowledge but in ignorance.
Figure 1. Researcher’s travel kit. (Numbers correspond to the subheadings above.)
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To many people, though, shaping a question in ways that make it an appropriate focus
for a research exercise does not come naturally. The early stages of supervising student
research projects often involve many iterations before the student arrives at a question
that is manageable and can be explored with the resources available. However, a research
question (RQ) that achieves the balance of being ‘general enough to permit exploration
but focused enough to delimit the study’ (Marshall & Rossman, 2016) is arguably the
most important ‘tool of the mind’ for researchers.
(2) An appropriate route map
An essential requirement of a RQ is that it takes into account practicalities and so can
be addressed using available research methods.
The Greek origin of the word ‘method’ is rooted in the idea of a journey or ‘hodos’ (the
same Greek word is part of ‘Exodus’). A research method is a path to evidence. Tashak-
kori and Teddlie (1998) implicitly draw on the metaphor of a journey when they divide
research methods into exploratory and confirmatory. A confirmatory study follows a
well-trodden path that is clearly sign-posted, with succinct descriptions. Researchers
who follow the path look closely to see whether their observations and analysis accord
with those of their predecessors. If a study is exploratory, descriptions of the method
are less prescriptive. Research that draws on exploratory studies may identify new
paths for exploration, or may add details that can be confirmed by later researchers.
Such variation is implicit in Thomas Kuhn’s division of academic studies into pre-
paradigmatic and paradigmatic disciplines (Kuhn, 1970). In pre-paradigmatic disci-
plines, narratives compete. If one narrative proves to be significantly more successful
than others at explaining phenomena and predicting events, it becomes the basis of a
Kuhnian paradigm, and the route maps associated with it become more confirmatory.
If this does not happen, different narratives will propose other paths to evidence and
offer more scope for exploration.
This process is apparent if one looks at early research into scientific phenomena. For
example, in December 1671, Isaac Newton published his ‘New theory about light and
colors1’ (Newton, 1671). At the start, he outlines the method that led to his new theory:
… in the beginning of the Year 1666… I procured me a Triangular glass-Prisme, to try there
with the celebrated Phenomena of Colours. And in order thereto having darkened my
chamber, and made a small hole in my window shuts, to let in a convenient quantity of
the Suns light, I placed my Prisme at his entrance, that it might be thereby refracted to
the opposite wall. It was at first a very pleasing divertisement, to view the vivid and
intense colours produced thereby;… I became surprised to see them in an oblong form;
which, according to the received laws of Refraction, I expected should have been circular.
Newton is reporting a phenomenon that, at the time, was poorly understood. His
account is discursive and includes qualitative details (such as an expression of surprise)
that would be out of place in a modern description of a physics experiment but are appro-
priate in an account of exploratory research. He uses over three hundred words to explain
what he did with his ‘Triangular glass-Prisme’ and to describe his observations. It is not
until after this that he introduces his great insight, which was to use a second prism to
examine the bands of coloured light that emerged from the first. Later accounts, which
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sought to confirm Newton’s findings, eliminate most of the description and concentrate
on the prism and its effect on light. The website of Woolsthorpe Manor (Newton’s
home), for example, describes the whole experiment in little more than one hundred
words (Fara, 2020).
(3) An inventory of assumptions
A research question should be practical, but a good research question should also be
interesting. One way in which it can achieve this is by helping to generate an interesting
theory.
Davis (1971), in his analysis of what makes a social theory interesting, suggests that its
intended audience must feel that ‘it denies the truth of some part of their routinely held
assumption-ground’. Karl Popper (2002, p. 83) also emphasises the importance of chal-
lenging assumptions, particularly in the pure sciences. He argues that where ‘applied
science takes pure science as ‘given’ or ‘known’‘, pure science is the logical reduction
‘of ‘known’ facts and ‘known’ theories to assumptions of which we know very little as
yet, and which have still to be tested’.
In 1973, Anthony Biglan proposed a classification of academic subjects that has now
become familiar. According to Biglan’s primary classification (Hard / Soft), a subject’s
status is determined by whether the subject is shaped by an underlying paradigm.
However, it is his secondary classification (Pure / Applied) that is of particular relevance
to this section. Taking the above observation of Popper, it could be argued that what
determines whether a discipline is Pure or Applied is the discipline’s relationship to
assumptions: a Pure subject challenges and tests assumptions, while an Applied one is
built on acceptance of them.
It is therefore important to stress that what is being discussed in this section is one way
to make a RQ interesting. It should not be inferred that RQs associated with Applied
research are intrinsically less interesting. They are, though, interesting for different
reasons such as, for example, the exploration of affordances (see Section 7) arising
from earlier research.
A standard description of reasons for a literature review is that it enables a researcher
‘to justify the research topic, design and methodology’ (Hart, 2018, p. 11). One of the
most important ways a literature review does this is by summarising evidence that
helps to identify and justify assumptions relevant to the planned study. Typically, this
leads to the identification of gaps in research, and the formulation of RQs designed to
fill those gaps. Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) draw on the ideas of Davis (1971) and
suggest that more interesting RQs arise when researchers challenge the assumptions
that underpin studies summarised in the literature review.
However, all literature reviews have limitations (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005), one of
which is that not all assumptions are identified in a survey of literature. One exercise I use
when teaching research methods in China helps to reinforce this point. I ask students to
imagine two office blocks, 35 km apart: one in Hong Kong, the other in Shenzhen. Both
are built to the same design, have the same dimensions, and are constructed from the
same materials. The two buildings have the same number of storeys, with the same
gap between floors. In Hong Kong, on a given day, a man climbs to the fifth floor,
raises a 2 cm diameter (30 g) ball-bearing above his head, and at midnight, releases it.
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Meanwhile, his identical twin brother climbs to the fifth floor of the building in Shenzhen
and does the same thing at the same time. Which ball hits the ground first?
Typically, students treat the question as an exercise in physics and discuss wind resist-
ance, expansion and contraction of the ball-bearing, variations in local weather con-
ditions, etc. When the discussion takes this course, the consensus is that it is
impossible to answer the question because there are too many immeasurable local
variables.
All researchers have blind spots which cause them to make assumptions without rea-
lising it. The purpose of the exercise is to provide an example of an easily overlooked
assumption that has a profound effect on an outcome. In this example, students tend
only to regard physical factors (dimensions of the buildings, the twins, and the ball-bear-
ings) as being relevant. Occasionally though, a student will recall that, because of British
influence, the twin in Hong Kong would enter the building on the ground floor and climb
five storeys, while the twin in Shenzhen would enter on the first floor and climb four
storeys. The Hong Kong twin would therefore be one storey further from the ground
than his brother.
Here, the consequences of the oversight are trivial and it would be easy to compensate
for the differences in floor numbering. Other examples are more significant, and range
from the disturbing (Plenke, 2015) to the dangerous (Oppenheim, 2020).
Plenke describes problems experienced by black hotel guests when they tried to use an
automatic soap dispenser. Unfortunately, there must have been a data gap in the research
process that led to the dispenser’s final design. Its sensors only responded to pale skin, so
a significant minority of guests found themselves unable to use it.
Criado-Perez (2020) provides numerous examples of data gaps leading to blindspots.
The examples she cites are all problems caused when decisions were based on research
that overlooked physical differences between men and women. One that became particu-
larly significant at the time of the COVID-19 outbreak was the design of Personal Pro-
tective Equipment (PPE). Despite the fact that, according to the British Medical
Association, 75% of UK National Health Service workers are women, the PPE they
relied on was designed for the ‘size and shape of male bodies’ (Oppenheim, 2020).
Such cases highlight the value of reviewing not only the research literature, but also the
researchers who generated it, and asking how the reported findings might have differed if
the research had been carried out by someone of a different sex, a different colour, or
from another culture. For anyone planning a research project, therefore, it is useful to
consider how their experiences and circumstances differ from those of researchers
who carried out similar work, and to think about how those differences might affect
findings and the interpretation of those findings.
(4) Going back to a point of agreement
When I identify assumptions that I believe should be challenged, then implicitly I also
identify assumptions with which I am in agreement. It then becomes helpful to ask who
else agrees with these assumptions. All researchers whose work is connected with mine
will also be making assumptions. The set of assumptions upon which there is maximum
agreement represents a kind of academic ground zero; and it can be instructive to try to
identify this and to make it explicit.
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Understanding where experts agree is particularly valuable in fields that bridge disci-
plines (such as Information Science). Two seminal papers, both highly cited in Infor-
mation Science, attempt such an exercise. Maslow’s famous hierarchy of basic needs
draws on physiological and psychological research to explain human motivation.
Maslow (1943) argues that humans are motivated by several desires, which are prioritised
according to circumstances. People must satisfy the desire for basics such as food and
water before they can focus on other desires, such as safety, love and ‘self-actualization’.
In introducing his ideas, Maslow emphasises that, rather than trying to challenge
assumptions in any of the fields upon which he draws, he is seeking to develop a
theory that conforms to ‘known facts, clinical and observational as well as experimental’.
The resulting theory is presented as ‘a suggested program or framework for future
research’.
Similarly, Claude Shannon’s ‘Mathematical Theory of Communication’ (Shannon,
1948) does not seek to challenge the theories that his colleagues in Bell Labs relied on.
At the time that the theory was being developed, Shannon was working with engineers
whose expertise was in telegraphs, telephones, television or radio. Shannon’s break-
through came after he set out to identify and analyse ‘The fundamental problem of com-
munication’. He developed a mathematical model based on the observation that all the
engineers he was working with, regardless of the technology in which their expertise
lay, shared an interest in transmitting and receiving signals, and in overcoming obstacles
to transmission.
Both papers attempt to build on what, at the time they were written, were seen to be
uncontroversial assumptions, and even though there has subsequently been criticism
(particularly in the case of Maslow: e.g., Neher, 1991), both articles still provide a
useful starting point for new research.
(5) Descriptions include, definitions divide
Definitions allow researchers to point to the phenomena they are researching. Good
definitions help subsequent researchers to align their work to earlier studies. However,
definitions are not the only way of pointing and may not be the best means of doing so.
A classic form of paradox discussed by ancient Greek philosophers is the sorites
paradox (derived from the Greek word for ‘heap’; Hyde, 1997). It is summed up in the
following assertions:
(a) I have a heap of sand;
(b) If one grain of sand is removed, I still have a heap.
The paradox becomes apparent if these assertions are used to form the basis of an
algorithm:
{ 1. Take a heap of sand } (Repeat).
1. Remove one grain
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If assertions (a) and (b) are both true, then regardless of how many times a grain of
sand is removed, I still have a heap. Clearly, there is a problem.
The paradox arises where there is an implicit assumption that a clear boundary (deter-
mined by the number of grains of sand) separates heaps from non-heaps. To define
something is (according to the word’s Latin origin) to put a boundary around it and
thereby mark its limits; but as illustrated by this example, limits can be hard to mark.
One of the reasons why limits can be hard to mark is that definitions are influenced by
domain. Every culture and community defines things according to how it relates to those
things: a definition may be based on the nature of a thing, on how it’s used, or on what it
does. A botanist’s definition of fruit, for example, is different from that of a cook. Bota-
nists relate to plants as subjects of study, and define fruits according to their role in a
plant’s life cycle. Cooks relate to plants as things to be eaten, and define fruit according
to what they contribute to a meal. Botanists class aubergines, chillies, courgettes, okra,
and olives as fruit. Cooks do not trust botanists to make fruit salads.
Although the subject being researched will determine what is defined, researchers can
choose how something is defined, allowing definitions to be shaped by the objectives of
the researcher. Confirmatory research assumes limits, while exploratory research
attempts to identify and describe limits. This contrast between the definitive and the
descriptive is at the core of Information Science. While some Information Scientists
explore the nature of information by considering users of information and their relation-
ship to it (e.g., Buckland, 1991), others work with Shannon’s mathematical definition,
which unequivocally separates information from non-information, and quantifies the
former (Shannon, 1948).
However, just as assumptions regarding the nature of a heap lead to a paradox, so too
do assumptions associated with Shannon’s definition of information. Shannon identifies
the domain of his definition by stating that semantic aspects of communication are irre-
levant to the engineering problem. According to Shannon’s definition, information is the
content of a signal. If the signal is long, it has a lot of information; if it is short, it has little
information. A signal can be meaningless, repetitive, or wholly unoriginal and (by Shan-
non’s definition) still contain information. For engineers wishing to transmit signals, this
is not a concern: information has been unambiguously defined. People in receipt of a
large number of signals though, may find themselves suffering from an overload of infor-
mation that is meaningless, repetitive, unoriginal, and consequently, completely uninfor-
mative (Madden, 2011).
A definition therefore, not only helps to identify the limits of entities and phenomena
being researched, it also helps to mark the domain within which the research is relevant.
Sometimes, though, particularly in exploratory research, attempts to define phenomena
may be unnecessarily limiting. The physicist Erwin Schrödinger set a useful example
when, in a famous essay, he considered the question: ‘What is life?’ Rather than trying
to define life, Schrödinger chose to describe it, concentrating on descriptions of the
things living entities do that distinguish them from non-living entities (Schrödinger,
1992). It is an approach I adopted in an article exploring the link between information
and biology. The article does not attempt to say what information is; instead, it begins
with a description of what information does (Madden, 2014). As is often the case, it is
possible to study the impact of something without having a clear understanding of its
nature.
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(6) Comparing and contrasting
Comparators can be particularly useful tools when describing the focus of a research
study. Understanding one thing in terms of another is a common approach in many areas
of research: phenomenon B may be compared with phenomenon A, or it may be com-
pared with a conceptual model derived from a synthesis of data from several sources.
Studies of the brain, for example, have long drawn on contemporary technologies to
interpret their findings. Nowadays, it is normal to compare the brain to a computer. Pre-
viously, models of brain functioning were based on a telephone exchange. Prior to that,
the brain was compared to a telegraph system, and earlier still, it was likened to a mill
(Searle, 1991).
Where similarities are sufficiently robust, it becomes possible to classify B with A,
allowing knowledge of A to be applied to B. It was induction of this sort that led to
the systematic ordering of species in biology, and enabled chemistry’s Periodic Table
to be compiled (Jensen, 1986).
Where comparison is used to classify phenomena, then implicitly circumscription is
occurring. This is a rule of conjecture that can be used… for ‘jumping to certain con-
clusions’ (McCarthy, 1980). Circumscription produces a set of assumptions that can be
‘taken as read’. If A and B are grouped together, then what applies to A is assumed to
apply to B until new evidence suggests otherwise.
New evidence emerges because each comparator brings with it the questions: (i) In
what ways are A and B alike? (ii) In what ways are they different? Wherever comparison
is used in a research exercise, some variation of these questions can helpfully be incor-
porated as a RQ.
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is a familiar example of comparing phenomena (individ-
ual humans) and assuming that person B is sufficiently similar to person A that knowl-
edge of A applies to B. Criticisms of Maslow’s work have arisen from attempts to address
questions (i) and (ii) above. Neher (1991) makes a particularly useful point when he cri-
ticises Maslow for ignoring the impact of cultural difference on human motivation: ‘we
develop our ‘humaness’ [sic]… through being socialised into the norms of our particular
culture’. Neher argues that, although Maslow neglected the importance of culture, the
factors that Maslow identifies as motivating ‘normal’ humans are ‘in the mainstream
of Western values that tend to glorify the individual’.
According to this argument, therefore, Maslow is not comparing real person B with
real person A. Instead, he is comparing B to an unacknowledged norm based on
Western values. Use of norms as comparators is common and can be helpful, but
failure to acknowledge them creates the kind of biases that create soap dispensers
which only work on pale hands, and PPE that does not fit women.
(7) Reviewing emergent opportunities
Careful planning is key to any research project, but sometimes it becomes advisable to
change plans. This may be because things go wrong and planned activities become
impossible or impractical. Often though, there are more positive reasons for altering
plans. In abductive research, lessons learned in the course of a project may yield expla-
natory inferences (Douven, 2011) that make it worth rethinking elements of the project.
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Sometimes, when collecting quantitative data, qualitative observations provide insights
that help with analysis and interpretation (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). Also, new
developments may suggest approaches that were unavailable at the planning stage: for
example, Madden (1995) was based on a re-analysis of my PhD findings that became
possible after I was given access to new software.
Regardless of whether a change in plans is brought about by unforeseen problems, new
insights, or the availability of new tools, it will generate new opportunities. One concept
of particular value in reviewing those opportunities is affordances.
The word ‘affordance’was coined by the psychologist James Gibson to help explain his
theory of perception (Gibson, 1979). Gibson argued that an animal does not perceive its
environment in terms of the absolute properties of the environment’s component parts.
Rather, it perceives the actions afforded to it by those parts. These actions (affordances)
differ according to the relationship that the animal has with its environment, and accord-
ing to the animal’s circumstances at the time. For a human being, air affords breathing;
water affords drinking; a round stone affords throwing; a sharp stone affords cutting. The
same elements of an environment would clearly offer different affordances to a bird or a
fish.
Gibson used the term ‘affordance’ with reference to physical environments, but it is
also relevant to the cognitive environment of researchers. Changed circumstances, new
insights and new techniques all offer new affordances, but identifying them may
require divergent thinking.
(8) Choose a narrative
Bruner (1990, p. 64) observed that people do not deal with the world event by event.
Instead, they frame events in larger structures that provide an interpretive context for
the components they encompass. In other words, they tell stories.
The telling of stories is commonplace in all human societies (Gottschall, 2013) and is
an important means of cultural transmission (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). Stories identify
factors that link players and places and present them as sequences of events, with a begin-
ning, a middle and an end (Fludernik & Häusler-Greenfield, 2010). In so doing, they
suggest associations and causes, thereby assigning ‘relational significance’ to actions
and events (Polkinghorne, 1995). What distinguishes research tales from other tales
though, is that, in research tales, the associations and causes are systematically questioned
and tested.
I am using the word ‘story’ in a looser sense than Polkinghorne. He asserts that the
subject matter of stories is human action, involving humans (or anthropomorphised
non-human characters), and suggests that ‘the knowledge carried by stories differs
from that which has been promoted by the Western scientific tradition’. If, however,
instead of humans, the protagonists in a story are taken as being entities that affect, or
are affected by, other entities with which they share a space, then the phenomena
described in the Western scientific tradition become the subject of stories.
Players in a story need not be human, or even animate. A cat, while walking along a
shelf, knocked a plate onto the floor. The plate fell and broke. The cat and plate are
(respectively) active and passive players, linked by the cat’s actions. In Newton’s
account of the experiment that led to his ‘New theory about light and colors’, he
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placed his Prisme in a position where a convenient quantity of the Suns light could pass
through it. The prism then refracted the sunlight to the opposite wall. Newton, the prism
and the sunlight are the players connected by actions and consequences.
In later tellings, the story is stripped down. In subsequent confirmatory research into
the interaction between prisms and light, the experimenter is removed from the narrative
and the only players are the prism and the light. After sufficient confirmatory research,
their interaction becomes accepted as a fact. In the context of certain physics exper-
iments, there is no need to regard the prism and light as separate players. Instead,
prism + light + refraction merge to become a phenomenon that forms part of the stage
on which other stories are played out.
Stripping down of stories is not necessarily a matter of choice on the part of research-
ers, however. Stories get simplified in the process of transmission, losing details and
becoming shorter (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). Evidence suggests that story-telling is as
much about reconstruction as about remembering (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). Remem-
bered details, such as key statistics and relevant images (e.g., Figure 1) form a skeleton on
which the flesh of new stories is grown, sometimes resulting in distortions. So, for
example, when people are advised to drink eight glasses of water (c2 litres) a day, this
is a misrepresentation of research which recommends that adults should take in 2.5
litres per day (Labos, 2018). The ‘eight glasses’ advice omits the important contextual
detail that Most of this quantity is contained in prepared foods (National Research
Council, 1948).
Researchers therefore need to prioritise details and emphasise the most significant; but
in emphasising what is significant, context should be presented in a way that frames any
findings and clearly identifies the limits of their relevance.
Conclusions
Novice researchers seeking to learn basic research skills are often confronted with
detailed discussions of the philosophical implications of approaches they are considering
(or have been told to consider) for their research. To draw on Midgely’s plumbing
analogy, they are treated like a thirsty person being given an explanation of how a tap
works instead of a glass of water.
Except that, because they encounter a cacophony of diverse epistemologies and a welter
of names (Pallas, 2001), they must first decide whether their water will come from a tap, a
faucet or a spigot. To make matters worse, philosophical terminology is used inconsist-
ently, with the same term being used in different, and sometimes contradictory, ways
(Crotty, 1998, p. 1).2
Earlier, when considering definitions, I emphasised their value in helping researchers
to point to the phenomena being researched. Definitions can only achieve this if used
consistently. However, as was stated above, defining something is not the only way of
indicating it. The purpose of this article is to identify elements that are common
across different branches of research. I described a collection of research ‘tools’ and pre-
sented them, initially as a set of questions, and later (in Figure 1), as an analogy.
Discussion between researchers with varying levels of experience has an important
role in the development of novice researchers (Knight & Zuber-Skerritt, 1986;
Malfroy, 2005; Zuber-Skerritt, 1987). I began this article with the observation that, in
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researcher discussion groups, when the researchers stopped arguing about philosophical
differences and focused on the processes of research, they found that they had more in
common than they had supposed. The set of research tools listed here is based on my
experiences as a mixed methods researcher and a teacher of research methods. As
such, it is far from exhaustive and can usefully be supplemented. I hope, though, that
it will help to create a context in which researchers can better understand their
approaches in relation to those of others.
The answers that researchers give to the listed questions will vary according to the
nature of their research. Good research training will encourage them to reflect on
what answers other researchers might give, and what different choices may arise
because of those answers. In this way, inexperienced researchers can begin to explore
the philosophy of research before attempting to decide which epistemological label to
attach to themselves.
Notes
1. Spelling used in the original was variable and has been preserved.
2. There has even been the unintentional coining of new terms. Several publications refer to
‘anxiology’, which is presumably a study of the concerns arising from attempts to get to
grips with philosophy.
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